                        2000 Season Disk Notes
                        ----------------------

For the past several weeks, we've been immersed in the process of creating 
the 2000 Season Disk.  Now that the stats are loaded, the ratings are 
assigned, and our final testing is well underway, we thought we'd take 
some time to discuss what goes into the season disk, how we come up with 
our ratings, and how to interpret those ratings.

Every year, our fielding ratings generate more questions and comments than
anything else, so we'll once again be devoting much of this note to our work
on defense.  You'll find comments on certain players and our annual review
of the Gold Glove awards.

Those of you who have been customers of Diamond Mind for a while will 
recognize that some of the material in this note has changed very little 
since last year.  We apologize for making you wade through some things that 
you already know, but we feel it is important to repeat certain comments for 
the benefit of the many new customers who have begun playing Diamond Mind 
Baseball in the past year.

These topics are covered in this note:

  Copyright notices
  License agreement
  Disk contents
  Real-Life Transactions, Game-by-Game Lineups, and Schedules
  Parks and Weather Information
  The Accuracy of Real-life Statistics
  Real-life Salaries
  Holds and blown saves
  Player Ratings Philosophy
  Bunting Ratings
  Running and throwing
  Measuring Defensive Range
  Team Wins and Losses
  Parting Thought


Copyright notices
-----------------

The real-life statistics on this 2000 Season Disk are Copyright 2000 by 
STATS, Inc.  Any commercial use or distribution without the express 
written consent of STATS is strictly prohibited.

This document and all other information in this 2000 Season Disk are 
Copyright 2000 by Diamond Mind, Inc.  Any commercial use or distribution 
without the express written consent of Diamond Mind is strictly prohibited.


License agreement
-----------------

Please read this license agreement carefully.  Use of Diamond Mind Baseball
("the Software") and related Season Disks constitutes your acceptance of 
these terms and conditions and your agreement to abide by them.  If you do 
not accept these terms and conditions, return the product(s) to Diamond 
Mind within 30 days for a refund.

The Software and Season Disks are protected by copyright laws and 
international copyright treaties, as well as other intellectual property 
laws and treaties.  

This license agreement grants you the nonexclusive right to use the 
2000 Season Disk for personal and recreational use.  Commercial use of 
the 2000 Season Disk is not permitted.  You may not rent or lease the 
2000 Season Disks.

You are authorized to make backup copies of the 2000 Season Disk for the 
sole purpose of protecting your investment.  You may transfer the 2000 
Season Disk freely from one computer to another, so long as there is no 
possibility of it being used by two people in two places at the same 
time.

If you administer or play in a league that uses Diamond Mind Baseball and 
the 2000 Season Disk, you are authorized to distribute copies of the 2000
Season Disk to other league members, PROVIDED YOU FIRST RECEIVE 
CONFIRMATION FROM DIAMOND MIND THAT EACH AND EVERY PERSON TO WHOM YOU ARE
MAKING THE DISK AVAILABLE IS A REGISTERED OWNER OF THE DIAMOND MIND 
BASEBALL GAME AND THE 2000 Season Disk.  Distributing the 2000 Season
Disk in any other fashion is a violation of our copyright and is strictly
prohibited.

You may permanently transfer all of your rights under this license 
agreement provided you retain no copies and the recipient agrees to the 
terms of this license agreement.

The 2000 Season Disk is provided "as-is" without warranty of any kind.  
Diamond Mind will not be liable for any special, incidental, consequential, 
indirect, or similar damages.


Disk contents
-------------

We have created player records for everyone who appeared in the big leagues 
this season -- that's a record total of 1230 players (632 batters and 598 
pitchers), including 136 who played on two teams, 6 who played on three
teams, and one who appeared with four teams.  In the two months since the 
season ended, we've computed, reviewed, and loaded into your season disk 
files:

* over 60,000 stats: batting, pitching, fielding, starts by position

* over 9,000 player facts: names, batting and throwing hands, birthdates

* over 20,000 player ratings that you can see:  injury, bunting, range, 
running, throwing, and so on 

* over 40,000 ratings that you can't see:  the event tables and 
pitch-by-pitch ratings that make the game produce accurate results

* opening day rosters for every team, plus more than 2,000 real-life 
transactions, and

* real-life starting lineups for all 2429 games played this season

If a player appeared on more than one team in real life, we have created a 
player record for each team (for people who do season replays using the real 
rosters) plus a combined record (for use in draft leagues).  The combined 
records appear in the free agent listings.


Real-Life Transactions, Game-by-Game Lineups, and Schedules
-----------------------------------------------------------

As you know, 2000 was the fourth season of inter-league games, and this 
season disk has been prepared accordingly.  There is a single schedule that 
includes games within leagues and inter-league games, and it is no longer 
possible to simulate just one league at a time.

  NOTE:  The disk is already set up for inter-league play, so please don't
  use the Organize/League/IL command to enable inter-league play.

We have compiled a complete set of over 2000 real-life transactions (trades, 
promotions and demotions, disabled list moves, and so on) and game-by-game 
starting lineups.  If you play seasons using the real-life rosters and 
schedule, Diamond Mind Baseball will process real-life transactions on the 
appropriate dates and will choose the real-life starting lineups for each 
game.                                 
  
  NOTE:  If you want to set up a league with newly-drafted rosters, please
  remember to use Organize/League/Modify to set the Play mode to "No 
  transactions" for both leagues.  The transactions and real-life lineups
  are meaningless once you change the rosters.

To make all this work, the league schedule shows games when they were 
actually played.  If, for example, a game was originally scheduled for April, 
but was rained out and replayed in September, it shows up on the schedule in 
September.  That's the only way to do it, since the starting lineups for 
a game in September might include a player who was not on the roster on the 
original April date.  (One exception:  there was a tie game, and that game
is not included in the schedule since it was replayed later.)

Because some of you might like to use the original schedule, we've included 
that schedule as a text file called sched00.txt that you can import.  If 
you do this, the as-scheduled schedule replaces the as-played one that is
currently loaded.

  NOTE:  If you load the as-scheduled schedule, remember to change the 
  league Play Mode to "No Transactions" or "Use Transactions" so the 
  game will no longer attempt to use the real-life starting lineups.


Parks and Weather Information
-----------------------------

As we do each year, we have updated the ballpark information to reflect 
changes in the physical characteristics of the parks, their statistical
impact on offense, and the weather patterns for the 2000 season.

Three new stadiums opened this year (Enron Field in Houston, Comerica
Park in Detroit, Pac Bell Park in San Francisco), and Seattle used Safeco
field for the full season.


The Accuracy of Real-life Statistics
------------------------------------

As always, your Diamond Mind Baseball Player Disk is the product of extensive 
research into player performance.  We begin by licensing pitch-by-pitch and
play-by-play data for every big league game, data that we licensed from STATS
Inc.  Using this detailed information, we compile batting, pitching and 
fielding statistics and carry out computerized studies that help us rate 
players for skills such as baserunning, throwing, bunting, and defense.

When I was growing up, I believed the official stats were absolutely perfect, 
but after years of compiling and licensing statistics from the leading 
statistics companies, I have learned that this is not always true.  I have 
the good fortune to live within a few miles of Pete Palmer, who compiled the 
statistics for Total Baseball, and I've been amazed at the large numbers of 
errors that he has uncovered in official statistics as part of his research.
More recently, it has become clear that published left/right statistics and 
fielding statistics are not always perfect even with today's computerized 
scoring.

For example, in a typical year, there are more than fifty situations in 
which a player bats from the opposite side of the plate than he normally 
does, mostly involving switch hitters who batted the "wrong" way against
knuckleball pitchers.  Other switch hitters may bat the wrong way when 
facing a pitcher they've really stuggled against.  And players occasionally
start or stop switch hitting during the season.

It's virtually impossible to catch all of these exceptions, and we're 
pretty sure that everyone, including Major League Baseball, has missed 
a few of them.  In our opinion, the folks at STATS are quite diligent 
about these things, and we believe our left/right stats are as good or 
better than any that are out there.  

You might also find it surprising that it's not always clear which way a 
player bats or throws.  Most of these cases don't matter much, since the 
majority involve relief pitchers who rarely or never batted during the 
season.  But sometimes an important player is hard to pin down.  It's not
all that unusual to find a player listed as a switch-hitter in the team's
media guide and as a right-handed batter in other places such as the 
official Major League Baseball baseball web site.  When this happens, we 
do our best to get them right, but we can never be 100% sure.

We know that many of you are avid readers of the STATS Major League 
Handbook and the STATS Player Profiles book.  We are, too.  They're a very 
valuable part of our reference library, and we use them all the time.  
These books are almost always very accurate, but there are occasional 
differences between the stats we publish and the ones you see in their 
books.  

Over the years, we've discovered that fielding stats get less attention 
when it comes to finding and correcting mistakes.  There are always small 
differences between the fielding statistics in the STATS books, the Elias 
data, and the MLB official statistics.

So if you see a small difference between the stats we publish and your 
favorite book or online site, don't be surprised.  Of course, if the 
difference is significant, please let us know so we can research it and 
make any necessary correction if it turns out that the error is in our 
data. 


Real-life Salaries
------------------

A few years ago, we made space in our player file to store the salary and
contract expiration year for each player.  It was never our intent to fill
in these slots with information on real-life contracts.  Rather, we added
them so Diamond Mind Baseball leagues that use salary cap systems would be 
able to enter their salaries, see those salaries on screen and in reports,
and have those salaries carried forward from year to year by our season 
disk migration feature.

But we've been asked by quite a few of our customers to add the real-life
salary information anyway.  And that's what we've done this year.  We're
grateful to Doug Pappas, a longtime Diamond Mind customer and member of the
Society for American Baseball Research (SABR), who agreed to let us use a
salary database that he has meticulously compiled for the past few years.

Many real-life player contracts have special provisions for bonuses,
incentive clauses, and deferred compensation.  So it's not always obvious
how to come up with a single number that represents a player's actual
2000 salary.  And most salary information is published at the beginning of
the season, so many of the players who are called up during the year have
not been included.  We've assumed that these players are at the minimum
salary in the most recent collective bargaining agreement.


Holds and blown saves
---------------------

These statistics are not part of the official rules of baseball, so the
various companies that produce the statistics and boxscores that you see
in the press and on web sites are free to define these any way they like.

In part because STATS was the first to come up with these ideas, the 
software that we use to compile pitching stats uses definitions that are
very similar to those behind the numbers in the STATS Major League 
Handbook.  But they are not exactly the same, so our numbers don't quite
match the ones in the STATS books.

Generally speaking, STATS awards a hold whenever a reliever enters the 
game in a save situation and holds the lead until another reliever takes
over.  But they don't award a hold when the reliever enters the game in
the middle innings, even though the reliever is entitled to a save if he
holds the lead through the end of the game and pitches effectively in 
the process.  And they don't charge a reliever with a blown save when he 
enters the game that early, either.  

Here are a couple of examples:

- a pitcher entered in the top of the fifth with a 1-0 lead and tossed 
a shutout inning before being replaced.  STATS didn't award a hold.

- a pitcher entered in the top of the fifth with a 1-0 lead and two 
runners on base, gave up a single that tied the game, and was pulled 
immediately.  STATS didn't charge him with a blown save.

Our software awards a hold and charges a blown save in these middle-
inning situations because we believe it's useful to measure the 
performance of these middle relievers.


Player Ratings Philosophy
-------------------------

The most important point I can make about our approach to rating players is
that we rate players based on performance, not reputation.  This philosophy
influences the meaning of our ratings and how we come up with them in the 
first place.

Our outfielder throwing rating, for example, measures the fielder's ability
to prevent runners from taking extra bases and to throw them out when they
try to advance.  A fielder earns a good rating by positioning himself well, 
getting to the ball quickly, making a quick release, throwing with power,
throwing with accuracy, and throwing to the right base.  Someone with a 
powerful arm might still get a subpar rating if he doesn't get into throwing 
position quickly, throws wildly, or throws to the wrong base.            

Similarly, our running rating is not just a measure of raw speed, but also
the ability to read the ball off the bat, get a good jump, and make good 
decisions about when to go for the extra base.

Our rating for defensive range measures the ability to make plays.  An 
infielder earns a good rating through positioning, quickness, soft hands, 
and effective throwing (quick release, arm strength, accuracy).  It's not
always the flashiest player who makes the most of the balls that are hit
his way.

Because our ratings measure overall ability to succeed in a certain phase of
the game, we look for ways to evaluate performance by analyzing play-by-play
data.  This approach is not a radical one.  Baseball people have been doing
this for over a century to measure batting and pitching performances.  We 
don't, after all, give the batting title to the guy with the prettiest swing, 
we give it to the player who hit for the highest average.  We don't give the 
Cy Young to the pitcher with the best mechanics, we give it to the one who 
was most effective.  Using statistics to evaluate performance is part of the 
tradition of the game.  

But this tradition extends only to hitting and pitching.  You never hear a
television or radio analyst talk about meaningful measures of baserunning, 
throwing or defense.  Instead, they talk about their impressions of the 
player -- how fast he looks, his quickness, strength and athleticism.  If
we applied the same standard to hitters, we'd never talk about on-base
percentage or slugging average.  If we did the same with pitchers, we'd 
never talk about walk-strikeout ratios and hits per nine innings.

Our approach is to apply the time-honored tradition of using well-crafted 
statistics to evaluate baseball performances.  The difference is that we 
don't stop at hitting and pitching.  We design ways to measure results in
all phases of the game.

We sometimes find players whose performance is better or worse than you 
would guess by watching them a few times a year.  And our ratings are
occasionally at odds with the opinions being expressed by some of 
baseball's most famous writers and TV personalities.  But we sincerely 
believe that doing original research into player skills is an important 
part of producing an accurate baseball simulation.

Suppose a player has a reputation for great defense but our analysis doesn't
show a superior performance.  If we gave in to public opinion and rate him
higher than his performance justifies, we'd have these options:

* reduce the range rating of one of his teammates so the team's defense 
  isn't overrated

* reduce the effectiveness of the team's pitchers to compensate for the
  extra plays this player will now make in the simulation
  
* disregard these side effects and allow the player, the team, and its 
  pitchers to produce better results than they should

We don't think it's fair to downgrade teammates so we can give a popular
player a better rating than he deserves.  And we don't think you'd want us
to disregard the side effects and publish a season disk with players and
teams who will overperform.  So we do our best to rate players based on
performance, even if that means we might take a little heat for a few of
our ratings. 


Bunting Ratings
---------------

Assigning bunt ratings would be easy if all we had to do was look at the
leaders in sacrifice bunts each year.  But it's not that simple, because
a player's batting stats don't tell us how many times he failed to get a
bunt down when called upon.  And we have separate ratings for sacrificing
and bunting for a hit, and if you're limited to the official batting stats,
there's no way to tell how many bunt singles a player legged out this year.

So we wrote a program to compile bunting information from the play-by-play 
and pitch-by-pitch data we work with each year.  This program looks at 
three situations -- bunting for a hit, sacrifices, and squeeze bunts -- and
counts the number of opportunities to bunt, the number of bunt attempts and
the results of those attempts.  The results include separate categories for
bunt hits, reaching on an error, being put out at first with other runners 
advancing, popping out, grounding into a fielders choice in which a lead 
runner is retired, grounding or popping into a double play, and fouling off 
one or more bunt attempts before swinging away.   

The number of bunts fouled off is quite important.  In 2000, for example, 
in ordinary sacrifice situations on grass and with nobody out, batters 
were successful in advancing one or more runners 87% of the time.  Provided
they got the ball in play, that is.  But 33% of the time, they bunted foul 
once or twice before swinging away.  Counting this type of failure drops 
the success rate to 58%.  In other words, there are more bunting "failures" 
due to fouled bunts than to poorly-placed bunts, and we would be missing a 
lot of important information if we tried to measure bunting ability without
considering fouls.

So our bunt ratings take all of these factors into consideration.  And it
sometimes means that a player with loads of successful sacrifices is given
a mediocre bunt rating because he also failed on a lot of attempts.


Running and throwing
--------------------

There are no official statistics for baserunning, though you may occasionally 
see some data on how often runners go from first to third on a single.  Our 
studies examine how often runners took extra bases on hits and fly balls, 
taking into account where the ball was hit (it's much easier to go to third 
on a ball hit to right), the number of outs (getting the jump with two outs 
makes a big difference), and whether the playing surface is grass or 
artificial turf (ground balls reach the outfielder more quickly on turf, so 
it's harder to take the extra base on many singles.)

Before wrapping up our running ratings, we also review a report showing the
number of times players were used as or replaced by a pinch runner.  If a 
manager frequently uses player A to run for player B, it's a good indication 
that the manager feels A is a much better runner.  It doesn't mean that A is
a great runner or that B is a lousy runner.  It could be an Av runner 
replacing a Pr one, or it could be an Ex runner replacing an Av one.  That's
why we look at who's replacing whom, not just the raw count of pinch-running
appearances or replacements. 

Outfield assist totals give us some insight into outfielder throwing, but 
they can also be misleading.  Some great throwing outfielders have their 
assist totals cut down by their opponent's unwillingness to run on them in 
the first place.  And not all assists are created equal.  Some assists result 
when a throw nails a lead runner, while others occur when the lead runners 
score but the batter is out at second advancing on the throw.  So we've 
written a program that allows us to see how many quality assists each 
outfielder earned during the season.

Our throwing ratings focus on the ability to prevent the lead runners from 
advancing (and to throw out those who try) using a combination of skills:  
getting to the ball quickly, getting the throw off quickly, and throwing 
with strength and accuracy.  Some players with strong arms are not very 
accurate.  Some players with weak arms compensate by getting into throwing 
position more quickly.  As with all of our ratings, we measure results, not 
just how often a player looks good making a throw.


Measuring Defensive Range
-------------------------

Defensive range -- the ability to reach batted balls and turn them into 
outs -- is one of the hardest baseball skills to evaluate.

Tradional fielding statistics -- putouts, assists, and errors -- tell us
how many plays a fielder was involved in, but they don't tell us how many
times he had an opportunity to make a play.  A sure-handed shortstop may
have very few errors but let his team down by failing to reach ground balls
that other shortstops turn into outs.  You can't figure that out just by
looking at traditional fielding statistics.

Some publications rank players based on range factors (putouts plus assists
per game) or fielding runs (a metric developed by Pete Palmer for the Total
Baseball encyclopedia).  But these statistics are based on the traditional
statistics and therefore suffer from the same limitations.  Specifically,
rankings based on range factors assume that each of those players had the 
same number of opportunities to make plays.  But they don't for several 
reasons:

- some pitching staffs strike out more hitters and therefore allow fewer
batted balls to enter the field

- the mix of ground balls and fly balls can vary quite substantially from
one pitching staff to another

- the mix of left- and right-handed pitchers varies from team to team, 
meaning that those teams face different percentages of left-handed hitters,
which in turn affects how many ground balls are hit to each side of the 
infield

- some pitchers are better than others, and weaker pitchers present fielders
with a higher percentage of difficult chances

- some ballparks require that fielders position themselves and affect how 
many batted balls can be reached with normal effort

For all of these reasons, it's much better to count the number of 
opportunities presented to each fielder and the number of times each fielder
was able to turn those opportunities into outs.  To that end, we have 
developed a series of analytical programs that use play-by-play data to
assess fielding ability.  Our methods, which are described in detail in an
article ("Evaluating Defense") that you can find on our web site, take all
of the above-mentioned factors into account.

We believe this analytical approach is much better than relying on the 
subjective opinions of baseball writers and broadcasters.  And it is much
better than relying on the Gold Glove voters to identify the best fielders.
Much too often, these observers focus almost all of their attention on one
aspect of defensive performance -- errors -- and neglect the ability to
reach batted balls in the first place.

In previous years, these season disk notes have included our comments on the
Gold Glove winners and other fielders whose ratings differ somewhat from 
past years or from their reputations.  This year, we have decided to publish
those comments in a separate document instead.


Team Wins and Losses
--------------------

It goes without saying that wins and losses are the most important things to
consider when judging a team's performance.  They are, after all, what the 
game is all about and what determines who gets to keep playing until there's
only one winner left.

But there is luck in baseball, and sometimes a team's win/loss record 
doesn't reflect the true strength or weakness of a team.  A team may fail to
score as many runs as usual given the walks and hits and stolen bases they
compiled, possibly because they didn't hit in the clutch or just because 
they happened to hit line drives right at people in key situations.  In a 
similar fashion, a pitching staff may allow fewer runs than normal given the 
number of runners they put on base and the homers they allowed.  And there
are times when a team will win 15-1 and lose 2-1 and 3-2, ending up with a 
losing record even though they outdid their opponents statistically.

I'm not going to argue that these statistical achievements are more important
than wins and losses, because they're not.  But they can shed some light on
what happened in the past season and how the team is shaping up for the 
coming year, because luck does tend to even out in the long run.

This year, I've computed two numbers for each team.  The first uses OPS,
the sum of on-base average and slugging percentage, which is a good measure
of overall offensive production.  The first column in the following tables
shows the difference between the OPS generated by the team's hitters and the
OPS of the hitters that faced its pitching staff.  I've stripped out the 
decimal points in the hope that the table is easier to read that way.  The 
second uses TBW, the sum of total bases and walks, which is another good
measure of offensive production.  

Neither is a perfect measure, to be sure, but they have the advantages of 
using data that's widely available, being easy to compute, and capturing 
the most important events that produce runs.  And because we're presenting 
the differences between offense and defense, park effects are eliminated 
from the equation.

So, for each AL team, the following table shows how their offense and 
pitching compared using OPS and TBW.  Baltimore, for example, had an OPS 
29 points (.029) lower than its opponents, and it produced 220 fewer total 
bases and walks than it allowed.  Both figures ranked 10th in the league.

        --- OPS ---    --- TBW ---
        Diff   Rank    Diff   Rank

  Bal    -29    10     -220    10
  Bos     31     6      207     6
  NYA     46     4t     219     4
  Tam    -68    13     -303    12
  Tor      0     8       46     8

  ChA     46     4t     208     5
  Cle     62     1      315     1
  Det     -2     9       35     9
  KC     -63    12     -418    14
  Min    -69    14     -328    13

  Ana     20     7       65     7
  Oak     47     3      311     2
  Sea     48     2      281     3
  Tex    -46    11     -285    11

The most surprising results come out of the Central division, where 
Cleveland topped the league in both measures but was unable to make
the post-season.  Meanwhile, the division leaders from Chicago were able
to earn the top seed despite ranking only fourth and fifth in relative
production.  The difference?  Cleveland left 133 more runners on base
than did Chicago this season.

Staying within this division, we see that Kansas City was somehow able
to win 77 games despite finishing 12th in relative OPS and dead last in
the league in relative TBW.  This is the complete opposite of what
happened in 1999, when KC won ten fewer games than their underlying
statistics would normally have predicted.

Here's the data for the senior circuit:

        --- OPS ---    --- TBW ---
        Diff   Rank    Diff   Rank

  Atl     54     2      236     2
  Flo    -37    12     -213    13
  Mon    -44    13     -217    14
  NYN     46     3      228     3
  Phi    -62    16     -291    16

  ChN    -54    15     -269    15
  Cin     11     7       -7     8
  Hou      9     8       29     7
  Mil    -49    14     -207    12
  Pit    -30    11     -181    11
  SL      39     4      218     4

  Ari     12     6       76     6
  Col     -8     9      -40     9
  LA      33     5      202     5
  SD     -24    10     -140    10
  SF      80     1      443     1

The four playoff teams were the top four finishers in both of these 
measures, but these numbers show that San Francisco really was the best
team in baseball during the regular season.  It's a shame they weren't
able to survive the first round of the post-season, because I think they
would have been a real threat to go all the way.

The surprises are in the middle of the pack, where Milwaukee doesn't have
the underlying statistics to support its 73-89 record and Houston was 
(statistically-speaking) a solid .500 team that won only 72 games thanks
to a horrible record in one-run games.  It's also clear that Florida was
quite fortunate to emerge from the season with 79 wins.  One reason for
their success is that they got 45 saves in 49 chances from a closer 
(Alfonseca) with a 4.24 ERA.


Parting Thought
---------------

We put a lot of effort into our player ratings each year.  It would be 
easier, I suppose, if we just carried forward a player's ratings from year to 
year or if we based our ratings on what we hear in the media.  But I don't
believe we'd be doing our job if we did that.  

Everybody knows that batting and pitching performances go up and down over 
the course of a player's career.  We believe the same is true of other skills 
such as defense and baserunning.  Using sophisticated analytical techniques 
and the best information available helps us spot changes in performance when 
they happen, not later when the media picks up on them.

But judgment and common sense are essential, too.  Many players do not get 
enough playing time in a single season to enable us to reach conclusions 
based on numbers alone.  Sometimes the way a player is used can produce a 
biased view of his abilities.  So we always look at the player's results in 
the context of his team, career (including minor league records for younger 
players) and an overall understanding of how baseball works.  

We hope you are pleased with the results, and thanks again for choosing 
to play Diamond Mind Baseball.
